Search results

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of managerial education levels on the wealth effect at the time of investment announcements, by testing two competitive hypotheses: the agency theory-based overinvestment hypothesis vs the Q-theory-based organizational legitimacy hypothesis.

The authors construct the sample by hand-collecting the announcement dates of capital investments from major newspapers published in Taiwan from 2006 to 2014. The authors then use the event study methodology to estimate cumulative abnormal returns at the time of investments announcements to measure the wealth effect. Finally, the authors examine the wealth effect for capital-investing firms with higher managerial education vs those with lower managerial education. The authors also conduct a cross-sectional regression to test the relation between the wealth effect of capital investment and managerial education.

The empirical results indicate that the wealth effect at the time of investment announcements is less favorable for firms with better-educated managers; this negative relation is mitigated for firms with higher institutional ownership and is aggravated for family-controlled firms; and the overall findings are supported by the agency theory-based overinvestment hypothesis, suggesting that higher managerial education lead to greater managerial optimism/overconfidence, which in turn increases the likelihood of overinvestment and implies a less favorable wealth effect associated with capital investment.

This study contributes to the literature by proposing a new, unexplored stock market’s reaction channel through which managerial education signals adverse information about potential overinvestment behavior, even though many studies suggests that managerial education serves as an indication of knowledge/capability and improves firm performance.